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Everywhere the call is out for ‘stakeholder’ involvement as a means for improving 
developmental decisions, particularly those involving complex technology, uncertain 
risks, and contending values. Everywhere but in funds management, it would seem. 
Despite the presence of obligations under policy instruments such as the Kyoto 
Protocol, funds management sectors around the world (comprising pooled investment 
schemes such as hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds) 
have been excluded from ecological crisis management discussions. Moreover, the 
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of these fiduciary vehicles have not been factored 
in climate-change discussions (Lohmann 2008: 362) and have not participated to any 
material extent in the mechanisms of the UNFCCC.   
The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC established three so-called ‘flexible 
mechanisms’ for reducing GHG emissions: (i) GHG emissions trading systems located 
in some developed countries including Europe and New Zealand and at a regional level 
in North America (the Western Climate Initiative consisting of four Canadian provinces 
and six US states); (ii) the Clean Development Mechanism and (iii) the Joint 
Implementation (respectively, CDM and JI). The CDM follows Kyoto by allowing 
developing countries, which are signatories to the Protocol (the so-called non-Annex I 
countries) to engage in sustainable development by means of GHG abatement projects. 
Developed (Annex I) countries may purchase the emissions saved (offset) by these 
projects in order to offset their own emissions and thereby meet their own committed 
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Kyoto-related emissions reduction target. The JI further allows developed countries to 
invest in developing country projects to offset their own domestic emissions, which can 
be also counted towards meeting their Kyoto targets. The private funds under 
management that might be made available for environmental management efforts 
warrants attention on the extent to which financing measures designed for 
environmental management have both facilitated and precluded the involvement of 
pension schemes, insurance companies and mutual funds. The chapter examines the 
prevailing financing system of environmental pollution management and, on the basis 
of a series of interviews with investment-related stakeholders, discusses the institutional 
realities that impact the participation of the investment sector in financing 
environmental pollution management. A final section makes a number of policy 
recommendations.  
Understanding stakeholder governance  
A consensual ‘new’ governance has emerged which is understood in relational terms 
that contrast with earlier command/control governance models (for example, Cadman 
2011: 20, Fiorini 2010: 578, Foxon and Pearson 2008: 148). This multi-stakeholder 
view of governance is promoted in some policy circles and, to the extent that the global 
polity is involved, deserves examination for its applicability. This section looks at the 
development of a particular version of stakeholder governance relevant to fiduciary 
investors (as already mentioned, referring to pooled investment funds) that have 
claimed to be interested in climate and energy-usage policies, climate-related risks and 
other related issues. 
The relational view of governance focuses on the necessary normative elements 
for collaborative social-political interaction. The relevant dynamic is said to involve a 
structure/process dialectic based upon participation and deliberation. Participation is 
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understood in multi-dimensional terms of stakeholder accountability / transparency and 
inclusive interest representation. An effort is also made, in the interests of integrity, to 
retain social justice as a type of benchmark by referring to the need for equality and 
resources. Democracy is treated as a central component of the decision-making 
processes used in deliberation. Social justice and democratic and participative decision-
making are treated as desirable characteristics of behavioural and problem-solving 
aspects of governance systems (Cadman 2011: 23).  
 According to this view, the governance of climate change abatement efforts 
becomes a matter of collaboration between and within the institutional vehicles charged 
with addressing the relevant problems arising, including the UN regime and the World 
Bank as initiating and coordinating institutions. Administrative and facilitating 
programmes are the regime’s Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the 
Kyoto Protocol (and national incarnations), the Clean Development Mechanism and the 
Joint Mechanism, and attempts to create a global cap-and-trade system with appropriate 
allocation of tradable emissions quotas across countries and time, the most notable 
example being the EU carbon market.  
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Note: See Lund (2007: 628-29) for a fuller explication of the connections and 
disconnections between environmental policy measures. 
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Certain connections and disconnections can be argued between some of these 
measures. Those that pertain to a fiduciary investor deserve consideration here. Pension 
funds in some European countries, Australia and New Zealand have been required to 
disclose their use of ecological considerations in the investment process (an 
administrative measure) (see, Haigh and Guthrie 2010). A fiscal measure would be a 
fiduciary’s decision to allocate funds towards companies enjoying concessional tax 
status for green-certificated investments, such as has been made available in the 
Netherlands. Fiduciaries interested in forming assessments of the financial implications 
of climatic risks associated with companies in which they hold investments might find 
useful regulatory measures such as mandated information disclosures of companies’ 
carbon emissions levels, and research and development measures such as the 
availability of energy-usage subsidies and utilisation of cap-and-trade allowances 
(although refer to the outcomes of empirical investigations presented below). Finally, if 
fiduciary duties were construed in trust law and fiduciary law as including consideration 
of ecological risks as they pertain to the portfolio, they might become regular issues for 
discussion at Board levels (Richardson 2011: 17). Present evidence suggests that the 
connections made above are latent; it is unlikely that most fiduciary investors would 
consider consideration of climate policy measures as falling within their obligations 
(Richardson, 2011: 5-10). 
Coordination of the regime currently rests on solutions conceived in terms of 
least-cost mitigation and adaptation terms, which do not permit easily the involvement 
of different political and economic actors (in particular, the private sector), nor allow for 
any significant degree of co-operation, decentralisation and competition (Zadek 2011: 
1058). According to the constructivist view of governance considered here, the regime 
would seem to have permitted insufficient interest representation, limiting participation, 
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while the rigid negotiating tactics used in international negotiations have not been 
particularly successful. Existing structures and processes have not facilitated 
collaborative interaction and consequently effective management of the economic, 
social, and physical outcomes of climatic changes has not been achieved.  
Despite the exposure of pooled investment funds to turbulent earth systems and 
despite the amounts of finance available in these sectors, private sources of finance have 
not been forthcoming (Zadek 2011: 1058, Andonova et al. 2009: 52). The markets’ lack 
of interest in the regime is related to doubts about the credibility of the system. Various 
reasons have been put forward for markets’ non-involvement in the policy regime. The 
wavering levels of commitment by signatories and the major exceptions to the regime in 
the cases of the US and China have contributed to doubts about the likelihood of 
national governments and the major superpowers effectively tackling climate change 
(Fiorini 2010: 581). The delegation of procedural elements to national governments has 
caused permits to be distributed without charge and quotas set at over-generous levels 
has made for a system of ‘carbon credits’ not attractive to investment. The absence of 
an apparent successor to the principal policy instrument and a lack of clarity between 
adaptation and mitigation efforts have left potential investors uncertain over the basic 
future architecture of the regime (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 123). This has been 
combined with a series of unclear determinations as to how financing should operate 
(Haigh 2011: 1367). This has led to a lack of confidence that an appropriate risk-
adjusted return will be attached to any of the regime’s mechanisms, including cap-and-
trade systems (Biermann and Gupta 2011: 1856, Marres 2011: 510). Pooled investment 
funds have therefore treated such elements of the regime as cap-and-trade, feed-in tariff 
systems and REDD+ as they might an exotic derivative, and have consequently not 
included them on their lists of permitted investments (Haigh and Guthie 2010: 195-
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199). Moreover, nascent initiatives in financial investments in renewable energy 
projects are simply not at the scale at which institutional investors would consider 
(Bowen 2011: 1020). Investors may also be unwilling to engage in politically 
controversial asset classes like the Clean Development Mechanism (for example, 
Lohmann 2008).  
It should be mentioned that there is no regulatory requirement for pooled 
investment funds to participate in cap-and-trade systems. Japan, the UK, New Zealand, 
Belgium, France, Germany and Denmark merely require managers of pooled 
investments to disclose ‘the extent to which environmental considerations’ are taken 
into account in portfolio construction  (Haigh and Guthrie 2010: 147). Similarly, 
investor associations in the UK and Australia do not require investment teams to report 
on the validity of climate investments (Haigh and de Graaf 2009: 413-417). Market-
driven regulation has been seen as contributing to the dissolution of responsibility for 
the negative externalities generated within the global economy (Prakash and Potoski 
2005: 350; King and Lenox 2000: 698). 
Pooled investment funds are rightfully looked at as major sources of finance yet 
are excluded from the regime’s architecture. Callon’s recognition of the European 
Emissions Trading System an as yet unfinished, experimental, process of learning has 
value (Callon 2009: 548). But in so far as the involvement of stakeholders in opinion-, 
decision- and policy-making is concerned, the specification of stakeholders, rather than 
the financing, has not yet commenced. Participatory governance models such as put 
forward by Cadman (2011) and evolutionary economic geography (Foxon and Pearson 
2008) tend to assume that a transition to more climate-resilient and low carbon 
economies is possible and moreover is path-dependent, meaning it has to somehow find 
a way through webs of institutions, knowledge networks, cultural values, and 
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complementary infrastructures. The method appealed to in the usual case is stakeholder 
participation. Robertson and Choi (2010: 90), in presenting their arguments for 
embedding governance considerations in ecological management, define organisational 
ecology as ‘establishing structures and processes that facilitate collaborative dynamic 
among diverse participants, which, in turn, can enhance the quality of decisions made 
and implemented’. Robertson and Choi use this definition to identify the stakeholder 
connections between a triadic form of the global polity: the state; ‘private’, commercial 
sectors; and natural ecological systems. Cadman (2011: 29) too has argued there is a 
need to connect resource providers, resource channels (legislators and policy makers), 
and resource recipients. Yet, it is plain that while the capital markets have been 
considered a latent policy resource for environmental pollution management (Lund 
2007: 629), the communication channels between institutional investors and policy 
makers are dissipated (Haigh 2011: 1385, Robertson and Choi 2010: 99). 
The realities of climate finance: what the investors think 
Interview study 
Interviews were used to provide insights into the ways investors have made 
sense of ecological crisis management, specifically, their assessment of the UN regime.  
Thirty-two interviews were conducted in May through August of 2010 with senior 
executives in managed investment institutions, selected using professional networks of 
the author and according to the direction of relevant investor networks known to the 
author, for example, the Carbon Disclosure Project (based in Sydney, New York City 
and London).  Organisations represented by the interviewees were located in the US, 
Japan, Australia, and Europe.   
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Interviewees were asked to describe how, if at all, they had participated in 
carbon trading markets and if they had used data on energy usage levels in their 
portfolio decisions.  Interviewees were provided additional background material to 
clarify questions, if needed, which typically took the form of a hypothetical investment 
decision-making scenario.  One in three interviewees, at the time of interview, was a 
provider of research provided to portfolio managers.  The next two largest groups were 
fiduciaries (28 per cent) and portfolio managers (22 per cent).   
All interviewees doubted the stability of the regime architecture.  A trustee of a 
European public-sector insurance company explained his reasons for refraining from 
permits trading:  
Carbon trading and all that kind of stuff: that’s not an asset class that we are 
looking at very greedily.  We don’t understand it.  We do not see a fit purpose from 
a risk perspective for us to go into that kind of asset class. 
All interviewees questioned the operationalisation of the regime, and if they 
were ‘expected’ to participate.  An environmental management analyst working in the 
London capital markets flagged his doubts on the credibility of the UN  regime and 
pointed at the salience of a short-term perspective for investment processes. 
Doubts about the science have a real political impact.  You factor in the time it will 
take to cost carbon, standardise information disclosures, and the right sort of 
regulation – that’s five years.  So at the moment, allocations according to carbon 
don’t matter to most [people]. 
The interviewee above explained that by ‘five years’ he/she was referring to the 
industry’s common asset al.location planning horizon.  Carbon reports were not 
considered useful for decision-making; a belief held by all interviewees.  The reasons 
are to do with the regular work processes of investors that treat information expected to 
 133 
impact on share price as relevant, as much as the informational quality issues associated 
with carbon reports.  The following three interview extracts are illustrative. 
1. Carbon emission data continues to be calculated and reported in different 
ways between regions, between companies, and sometimes even with companies.  
It’s the wild west out there...  (head of a ‘Responsible Investment’ advisory unit in 
a British insurance company) 
2. The most critical policy in Australia is a price on carbon emissions.  
Reporting does not influence investment decisions in and of itself.  Companies are 
generally careful to ensure that material price implications that may be reflected in 
their disclosures are addressed before they are disclosed [to data collectors and 
regulatory authorities].  This will change only once there is a price on carbon and 
[when] current disclosures attract a financial liability.  (head of a Europe-based 
environmental lobby group comprised of institutional investors) 
3. Information is not reliable because there is no standard for disclosure.  It is 
difficult to understand materiality and relevance of information to price.  (fiduciary 
of a North American stable of insurance companies and mutual fund trust 
structures) 
The interview data obtained are suggestive of a conclusion that investors’ 
participation in climate change management is contingent on institutional processes.  In 
the financial markets, the subjectivity of participation in ecological crisis management 
differs from that of civic engagement, where the methods and techniques used in carbon 
accounting render public engagement visible (Marres 2011: 530).  Portfolio managers, 
belaboured with client mandates, fiduciary obligation, and subject to workplace 
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conventions, are more likely to use carbon accounting techniques that render their 
engagement invisible.   
Discussion 
Some consideration must be given to the relations between the real-life exigencies of 
pooled investment funds, and administration of the UN regime. With respect to 
fiduciary investors, there are very few ‘devices of engagement’ (Marres, 2011: 517) that 
can help to enact a particular form of environmental participation as a legitimate form 
of investing practice. While policy makers have been eager to appropriate the discourse 
of financial services, they are yet to supply guidance on how policies on climate change, 
energy security, resource scarcity, and so on might best be applied to wealth portfolios. 
Financial institutions have been left to arrive at determinations without the basic 
categories that usually accompany their decision-making.  
Presenting as issues are the absence of a conceptualisation of transnational 
governance and a coordinating mechanism linking national regulatory systems. 
Participation in fiscal mechanisms by pooled investment funds might be frustrated given 
that central governments in the markets which with this chapter is concerned (with an 
exception in Norway) do not control the management contracts process of pooled funds 
(Clark and Hebb 2005: 2015). One might expect that uncertainties associated with 
derivative trading markets will be frowned upon by most pension funds, and acting as a 
conduit of firm-level measures such as energy-usage subsidies has not been in their 
usual remit. The interview extracts provided above suggest that fiduciaries have 
relegated the ‘trading’ elements of the UN regime at the level of a junk derivative. 
Certainly, the interviewees had no plans to participate in the major public financing 
mechanisms constructed to deal with the effects of global climatic changes.  
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Stakeholder dialogue designed to enable learning appears unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. A common issue for workers in the ‘Responsible Investment’ units 
of financial institutions in Europe and North America has been gaining access to and 
influencing investment teams and governing boards with their various agenda items 
(Haigh and de Graaf 2009). ‘Influence pathways’ have not in the usual case relied on 
stakeholder representation but on broad-scale behavioural change (see, Haigh and de 
Graaf 2009: 409).  
The effective exclusion of the capital markets from the climate policy regime is 
not the fault of policy makers nor of capital markets; it is to do with the interest 
representation permitted by a legally mandated, fiduciary duty to cater to and protect the 
economic interests of beneficiaries of vehicles like pension funds and insurance 
companies. Fiduciary and trust law require that for trustees and governing bodies of 
fiduciary investment vehicles, the beneficiaries of investment schemes are the relevant 
and only stakeholders. When a proposal arrives for a remit wider than the interests of 
immediate beneficiaries, such as a need for deeper and broader forms of climate 
financing, legal support is left wanting.  
These remarks permit only a tentative interpretation of the beneficial impacts of 
the current programme of the management of climate-change effects based on trading in 
GHG emissions allowances and rights linked to the creation of industrial projects. The 
calculation of the economic mitigation potential of emissions trading has been said to 
involve expected social benefits net of social costs and assuming that existing market 
barriers are removed by public mitigation policies. The conceptualisation that this 
entails is at the level of the individual, industrial firm; what would be required, 
however, is at the level of the global polity. Multilateral management of the effects of 
climate events depends on having a programmatic approach to ecological crisis 
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management, which links trading activities in financial derivatives to policy forums, in 
which financial and investment interests can participate meaningfully, rather than 
simply acting as the vehicles through which market systems operate. 
Yield-maximising, risk-averse investors, based on the outcomes of the interview 
research presented above, have little incentive to adjust their operations unless required 
to do so by governments, informed by peer behaviour, or unless treated to economic 
prospects. The types of ecological crisis management mechanisms that can be 
considered for pooled investment funds include, following Lund (2007: 628-629): 
legislative and regulatory policies like standards and reporting; fiscal measures and 
research and technology development like permit trade, subsidies and taxation; and 
administrative measures like labelling and stakeholder forums. Available fiscal 
measures are those that relate to the income and cost levels of pooled investment funds, 
such as concessional tax status for green-certificated investments (examples are 
provided by the Netherlands and China (Lund 2007: 628)). Relevant potential 
administrative instruments are a reconceptualisation of fiduciary obligation to include 
environmental and energy security risks, including the risk of ignoring energy 
insecurity; and requirement for pooled funds to disclose their exposure and responses to 
ecological crises to their beneficiaries (much like statutory financial disclosures).  
The intermediated nature of capital market structure conditions investors’ 
participation in measures such as permits trading and strategic investments in energy 
assets. Several reasons suggest themselves: 
- It can be expected that institutional investors subject to fiduciary and trust law 
will pay short shrift to the values and concerns of those not represented 
immediately by beneficiaries of pension schemes and insurance companies.  
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- Commercial relationships imbue and constitute fiduciary capitalism, as the first 
duty of a pooled fund’s board is delegation of investment management to experts. 
An intermediated structure operates against long-term financial assessment such 
as suggested by ecological considerations and, as much, ‘stakeholder 
involvement’. Brokerages, custodians, and advisory services used by fiduciaries, 
for example, are remunerated on the basis of the volumes of transactions.  
- Further, while investment firms might be provided fiscal incentives to 
differentiate themselves from rivals and to signal their environmental 
commitment, differentiation might not represent a viable strategy for a well-
diversified investor, as the portfolios of this type of investor are modelled on 
averaged benchmarks. 
Connections between the ambit of fiduciary responsibility and environmental concerns 
are considered in the next and final section. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Outcomes that can be associated with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Control infrastructure have been fewer than might have been hoped for. Extant 
initiatives (as at July 2011) are non-networked micro-financing at community levels, 
and variously successful attempts of venture capitalists to launch renewable energy and 
clean technology financial products.  
Unresolved issues have a tendency to turn into stubborn problems. In terms of 
climate justice, differencing relevancies can be linked to quietism on matters of access 
of the poor economies to basic services, for example, access to online weather alerts 
(Kym and Kouzmin 2009: 299-300). The reality of a future ecologically precarious, 
unjust world is given traction by multiple interlinked and systemic forces directing the 
policy pronouncements that have followed the Kyoto Protocol. Governments have 
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tended to make mention of the details of rapidly worsening living conditions in climate-
vulnerable regions only so far as to reinforce a division of the rich West (the carbon 
mitigators) and the poor Other (the carbon adaptors).  
Schnaiberg’s (1980) treadmill of production theory is a widely recognised 
theoretical tradition in environmental sociology.  Treadmill theory is based on a 
recognition of the dependence of societies on the natural environment, and the dramatic 
effects of contemporary societies on natural resources and ecosystems.  How that might 
work out in finance capitalism involves interrelations wider than the state apparatus, 
financiers, and companies.  What is called for is the inter-subjective acknowledgement 
of responsibility; perhaps akin to what Cadman refers to as organisational responsibility 
(2011: 24).  Only three of the thirty-two individuals interviewed for the research 
conducted for this chapter, when pressed, could articulate a sophisticated connection 
between turbulent earth systems and investment risk.  
The oddness of the proposition that the funds management sector should 
participate in environmental financing (Clark and Hebb 2005: 2016) might, by 
challenging the contingent rationality of financial markets, create spaces for imaginings 
that will be needed for criticism and transformation. Approaches might be found useful 
to contextualise the notion of widened stakeholder governance examined above with the 
worklife exigencies of equity and bond markets. Stakeholder governance is (almost) 
precluded in the financial markets, with institutional processes such as networked 
contracts of intermediaries and service providers dispensing with democratic 
representation. 
Recommendations for financial and intergovernmental policy makers.  
That the UN regime has not articulated with the funds under management in the 
capital markets suggests, if faintly, potential in networks of state and non-state actors 
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(Andonova 2010: 25). Examples have appeared in the work of the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies, the Carbon Disclosure Project and the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board, organisations which, independently of each other, 
have brought companies, investors and policymakers in North America, Europe, Asia 
and Australia together to discuss issues of environmental pollution management and 
without representation (that is, as non-partisan but connected individuals). Blatter 
(2009: 109) dispenses with representation requirement on grounds that not all 
stakeholders are experts, instead seeking a ‘coalition’ of people who ‘share a set of 
normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert’. More might be expected 
from meetings of policy experts, financiers, foresters, biologists, industrialists, 
philosophers and so on from a wide range of relevant disciplines making no claims to 
shared values (although their ‘interests’ might be shared), but a desire to learn 
something new. It should be noted that discussions on the efficacy of the Kyoto 
measures have assumed that the market is an appropriate vehicle to bring about efficient 
and desirable policy outcomes. Reliance on the market is precarious, however, 
particularly when its regulation is handed to the main market protagonists (Lohmann 
2008: 360-264; King and Lenox 2000: 700).  
Fiduciary representation deserves consideration if the resources of managed 
capital are to be accessed for environmental management purposes. At issue is devising 
ways to widen the scope of interest representation in capital markets to include all the 
recipients of climate finance. The target beneficiaries of climate finance will almost 
certainly include stakeholders outside the fiduciary remit of trustees and governors. 
After all, not all those affected by climatic changes are members of pension funds and 
insurance policy holders. Networks of fiduciary investors (for example, trustees), their 
service providers (for example, ‘asset’ consultants and brokerage firms), climate 
 140 
scientists, environmental engineers, and CEOs of businesses in climate-vulnerable 
regions might usefully be forged. However, more will be needed to make such networks 
effective in terms of policy outcomes. Conferences of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
were designed to achieve the meeting of economic and ‘environmental’ interests, 
disciplines and knowledge. The outcomes of recent COPs have not given investors 
reason to rush into carbon trading.  
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